Case summaries
In assessing claims based on political opinion, a broad approach needed to be adopted to ensure that the object and purpose of the 1951 Refugee Convention was met. Political opinion could be actual or imputed and had to be assessed in the context of the society that the applicant had fled. Political opinion should not be restricted to issues relating to party politics nor, in the context of persecution non-state actors of persecution, was it helpful to identify those who were on the side of the forces of “law and order”.
In cases where the applicant fears persecution from non-state actors, the home state can be judged to provide protection if it has in place a system of domestic protection machinery for the detection, prosecution and punishment of such acts, and has an ability and readiness to operate the machinery. Where the line is drawn will depend on the facts of the case.
The issue of an applicant’s nationality is integral to a claim for refugee status. In the great majority of asylum applications the nationality of the applicant is not in issue, but when it is put in doubt decision-makers must address it. Failure to do so would offend the nationality logic that underlies the refugee definition set out in Art 1A(2). The burden of proof in respect of nationality is on the applicant although the evidential burden may shift.
In assessing whether a state is a safe third country with regard to its interpretation of the 1951 Refugee Convention, it was not sufficient to assess whether the foreign state’s interpretation of the Convention was reasonable. The Secretary of State for the Home Department had to be satisfied that the foreign state applied the one true interpretation of the Convention decided upon by the UK Courts.
The 1951 Refugee Convention should not be interpreted so that a refugee sur place who has acted in bad faith is excluded from its protection and can be deported to his home country notwithstanding that he or she has a genuine and well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason and there is a real risk that such persecution may take place. Although such an applicant’s credibility is likely to be low and the claim must be rigorously scrutinised, he or she is still entitled to the protection of the Convention if a well-founded fear of persecution is accepted.
The Court of Appeal held that an asylum-seeker unable to return to his country of origin may indeed be entitled to recognition as a refugee provided only that the fear or actuality of past persecution still plays a causative part in his or her presence here. Further, the refusal of the State of nationality to permit return can constitute persecution.