Case summaries

The Court found a violation of Article 3 in relation to a subsequent application for asylum, which had been rejected on the basis that it contained no new elements indicating that the Applicants ran a real risk of being subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment on deportation to Russia. Because new information had in fact been provided, the national authorities were under an obligation to thoroughly review the information in order to assure themselves that the Applicants’ rights under Article 3 would be safeguarded.

The case dealt primarily with the standard of reasoning required in credibility assessment among other issues (travel findings and best interests of the child). In quashing the RAT decision, the High Court ruled that the RAT had not met the standard of reasoning required in assessment of the credibility of oral testimony (as established in the jurisprudence of the Court and EU law), reiterating the obligation upon the decision maker to ensure that each negative credibility finding is accompanied by an adequate rationale clearly outlining the reasons for such findings.

When addressing asylum claims, refugee status must be recognised when there is a well-founded fear of persecution for any of the reasons foreseen in the 1951 Refugee Convention. Assessment of an asylum request fundamentally needs careful consideration of the facts and personal circumstances of the asylum seeker, as well as an analysis of the nature of the risk. The criteria of this test does not have to be restrictive, it is sufficient that the competent authority has a rational belief that the requirements are met for the purpose of receiving refugee status.

Article 1F of the Refugee Convention relates to the application of a definition and not whether an individual seeking asylum should obtain protection or not. Therefore, and with regards to Article 1F(b), any post-offence conduct does not serve to mitigate the seriousness of an alleged non-political offence. No doctrine of expiation is to, thus, be applied to Article 1F(b).

The term serious used in Article 1F(b) denotes especially grave offending and requires no further qualification by the term “particularly." 

The degree of indiscriminate violence in certain parts of Iraq was such as to expose persons to a real risk of serious harm within the meaning of Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive merely due to their presence there.

However, other areas of the country (including Baghdad City) did not meet this threshold, and as such, Iraqi nationals could be forcibly returned to these areas as it would not generally be unreasonable or unduly harsh for them to internally relocate there. 

This case examined the denial of a minor’s application for asylum which was decided primarily on the failure of his mother’s application. The Refugee Appeals Tribunal did not consider Country of Origin Information (COI) from the child’s perspective. Furthermore, clear reasons were not given for the refusal decision. The High Court granted leave and quashed the Refugee Appeals Tribunals decision to deny refugee status to the child. The Court also held that the best interests of the child should be a primary consideration of the Tribunal both with regard to the procedure and substantive consideration of appeal. 

The Court ruled that when deciding whether the subsequent application is admissible, new facts regarding the individual situation of the applicant or her situation in the country of origin as well as change in the situation of the country of origin alone are significant. When examining whether the grounds of the first and the subsequent application are the same, the essence of the facts is important, not the manner in which they are presented.

With regard to the applicant’s argument that in the present case the legal grounds for granting subsidiary protection were not examined, the Court stated that in the decision on discontinuing the procedure because of inadmissibility of the application, the authorities do not rule on refusal of refugee status, therefore there is no self-standing legal basis to examine the grounds for granting subsidiary protection. The present application, as the inadmissible one, could not have led to the in-merit examination of the grounds for granting refugee status and therefore could not have included the examination of the subsidiary protection grounds.  

This Case examines the refusal to grant refugee status to a Nepalese national. The Tribunal failed to provide clear, cogent reasoning for the decision. Documentation and explanations provided by the Applicant were not included in the decision. Unreasonable assumptions were made by the Tribunal including: as the Applicant’s wife, children and brother were safely residing in the country of origin, this inferred that the Applicant could do the same; since the applicant spent 6 years living safely in India, he could continue to live there safely. The High Court criticised the procedural approach by the Tribunal and the lack of coherent reasoning provided. The High Court granted leave and quashed the Tribunal’s decision.

The Court expressed doubts as to whether it is constitutionally permissible to base the withdrawal of subsidiary protection on a “final conviction of a crime” without taking the circumstances of the individual case into account. The Austrian provision might not be in line with the requirements as set out by the European Union Directive 2004/83/EC and might therefore be unconstitutional.

The judgment concerns the scope of Article 21 of Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 with regards to derogation from protection from refoulement and the possibility to revoke a residence permit issued to a refugee pursuant to Article 24 of said Directive.