Case summaries
The right to be heard does not require, as a rule, that, where national legislation provides for two separate procedures for examining applications for refugee status and applications for subsidiary protection, the applicant for subsidiary protection is to have the right to an interview relating to his application and the right to call or cross-examine witnesses when that interview takes place. However, an interview must be arranged where specific circumstances render it necessary in order to examine an application with full knowledge of the facts.
The CJEU in this case expanded on its previous ruling of B & D. Whereas previously the scope of the exclusion clause for those engaging in terrorist acts was limited to engaging in, conspiring to or planning an actual act of terrorism with an international dimension, the CJEU has now widened the scope to include those who provide logistical support even where no act of terrorism takes place.
Analysing the legality of the refusal to grant child benefit payments to parents who are not habitually resident within the State for the benefit of their children.
Request to the European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling in the following issues:
1. Transfer of responsibility to the requesting member state under the Dublin Regulations due to procedural delay
2. Interlinked to this question is whether the plaintiff has a right to request a change of Member State’s responsibility.
3. Additional questions concern compliance with the Dublin Regulations and its correct implementation, primarily relating to the point at which an application for international protection is deemed to be filed.
Based on the principle of effectiveness, the CJEU ruled that a limit of 15 days to apply for subsidiary protection following a notification of the decision not to grant refugee status is particularly short and cannot be justified by the need to ensure an effective return procedure. The limited period endangers applicants’ ability to submit an application for subsidiary protection.
The Spanish Supreme Court’s Administrative Chamber decides on the appeal of an asylum applicant, whose application has been rejected. The applicant states that upon return to his home country (Ivory Coast) he will suffer a risk of persecution.
However, both the National Court and the Supreme Court ruled that no risk of persecution exists in this case, because there is no enough evidence to conclude on that risk.
The case concerned an application for judicial review of the decisions made on behalf of the Secretary of State to transfer the applicants to Malta, on the basis that such jurisdiction was the proper place for considering the applicants’ asylum claims. The applicants argued that such transfer would violate their rights under Article 18 of the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union (EU Charter) to have their asylum application determined within a reasonable time and on the basis of a fair procedure, as the Maltese asylum system had several shortcomings and contains procedures that are illusory or too slow. Dismissing the application, the Tribunal concluded that there was no evidence to support the argument that the applicants’ Article 18 rights would be violated if they were transferred to Malta.
A renewed application for asylum in a second country is admissible if the nature of international protection applied for differs from the protection already granted. Deportation to the country of the first application or the country of origin is not to be taken into account in this situation.
The issue to be decided in this case was whether the applicant was entitled to judicial review of the decision of the Refugee Applications Commissioners, or whether her complaints could be adequately addressed on appeal to the Refugee Appeals Tribunal.
The return of the applicants to Iraq violates Article 3 ECHR as there is a real risk of ill-treatment based on their personal circumstances as a targeted group and the Iraqi authorities’ diminished ability to protect them.