Case summaries

The exclusion of a person who had belonged to a terrorist organisation depended on a personal examination to see whether there were genuine grounds to attribute to him a personal responsibility as organiser, author or accomplice to serious crimes under ordinary law or actions contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

According to the Supreme Court of the Republic of Slovenia the general credibility of the Applicant is an internationally recognised standard that takes into account numerous conditions when assessing the Applicant’s level of credibility, who does not have any material evidence to prove his persecution. However, the Applicant’s general credibility will provide the necessary trust in his statement as regards his persecution for the state to grant him international protection even without any material or other evidence, merely on the basis of his statements. 

The Appellant should have demanded for an expert to be appointed already during the administrative procedure, at the very latest during the appeal. According to the Supreme Court the objection that a psychiatric expert was not appointed represents an impermissible appeal novelty. The Supreme Court also added that the psychological health of the parties in court procedures is assumed as a fact. 

The High Court held that the Minister is entitled in a subsidiary protection application to rely on the findings made during the refugee status determination process unless these findings are legally wrong or the reasoning is defective. The Applicant cannot “collaterally attack” the findings of the Refugee Appeals Tribunal (RAT) (which have not otherwise been challenged) through a judicial review of the subsidiary protection decision. The lapse of time amounting to almost one year between the oral hearing by the RAT and the issuing of its decision, could not be challenged in the context of seeking to review the subsequent subsidiary protection decision, and the reliance by the Minister on the RAT’s use of an expert medical report was permissible.

This case concerns the State’s obligation to attempt to trace the family members of unaccompanied minor asylum seekers.

The authorities of first and second instance—the Head of the Office for Foreigners and the Polish Council for Refugees—refused to grant refugee status or other forms of protection to an applicant from Uganda who had applied for refugee status because of his sexual orientation. They made the same decisions but on fundamentally different grounds and factual findings. The  first instance authority found that the applicant was homosexual but that the information about the country of origin indicated that his fear was not well-founded. The  second instance authority found that homosexuals are at risk of persecution in Uganda but that the applicant was not homosexual, and the opinion of a doctor who is a sexologist did not prove sexual orientation. Instead, this needed to be proved based on the testimony of the applicant, which is then verified in the context of his general credibility during the proceedings.

A Russian Federation citizen arrived in Finland from another EU country (Lithuania) where he/she alleged that he/she had been persecuted and claimed international protection on this basis. The Immigration Service denied the Applicant a residence permit, failed to examine the application for international protection and decided to deport him/her to Lithuania. The Immigration Service considered Lithuania to be a safe third country and the application for international protection was not examined in relation to his/her country of origin.  The Supreme Administrative Court took the view that the issue of international protection could not be dealt with in Lithuania as the grounds for the application were cited as persecution in that same country.  The Administrative Court was ordered  to overturn the Immigration Service’s decision and return the case back for further consideration.

The actual risk of inhuman treatment or punishment by the Taliban because of desertion from one of their forced recruitment training camps can justify a deportation ban according to clause 60 (2) of the Residence Act (Article 15(b) of the Qualification Directive) in the case of Afghanistan.
Targeted criminal violence is defined in Article 15 (b) of the Qualification Directive (clause 60 (2) of the Residence Act) but not in Article 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive (clause 60 (7) p. 2 of the Residence Act), because in this context there is no specific risk of an internal armed conflict, i.e. “indiscriminate violence”.  

1. Changes in the home country are only considered to be sufficiently significant and non-temporary if the refugee’s fear of persecution can no longer be regarded as well-founded.
2. Based on the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) which applies to the concept of “real risk” according to Article 3 ECHR (European Convention on Human Rights), a uniform standardof probability is applied to assessing the likelihood of persecution in the context of refugee protection; this corresponds to the standard of substantial probability. 

The conclusion can be drawn on the basis of the B. and D. judgment that, based on the description of Hizb-e Wahdat in the official report as a violent organisation, a policy of presuming 'personal and knowing participation' on the part of aliens who have fulfilled specific roles within the organisation is consistent with Article 12(2) of the Qualification Directive.

The case refers to an appeal to the Supreme Court brought by the appellant against the High National Court’s decision to deny asylum.

The appellant is a Nigerian national and claims to have left her country because of armed confrontations between the group she belonged to (the Massob) and other armed groups.After a demonstration organised by the Massob to demand freedom and independence for the group, the government retaliated against the demonstrators, killing several people.Therefore, she decided to flee the country with her husband and one year old daughter.During the crossing in a small boat from Morocco to Spain, her daughter died.On these grounds the Supreme Court recognised the appellant’s right to remain in Spain on grounds of humanitarian considerations.