Case summaries

When verifying an asylum seeker’s claimed sexual orientation, Member States’ freedom of action is constrained by the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

The evaluation of an asylum application should not be based on stereotyped notions and should include an individualised assessment taking into account the applicant’s personal circumstances, vulnerability in particular.

Not declaring homosexuality at the outset to the relevant authorities can not result in a conclusion that the individual’s declaration lacks credibility.

This case examined the compatibility of the Dublin II Regulation with the European Convention on Human Rights regarding transfers to Italy under the Dublin II Regulation.

The Court found a violation of Article 3 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment) of the European Convention on Human Rights if the Swiss authorities were to send an Afghan couple and their six children back to Italy under the Dublin Regulation without having first obtained individual guarantees from the Italian authorities that the applicants would be taken charge of in a manner adapted to the age of the children and that the family would be kept together.

The CJEU ruled that it had no jurisdiction to answer the questions referred as they concerned the direct interpretation of the provisions of the 1951 Geneva Convention.

The case considered an application against the decision of the Secretary of State denying the Claimants a right of in-country appeal against the removal of the Claimants to Italy under the Dublin Regulation. The Claimants argued that their removal to Italy would expose them to a real risk of a breach of their rights under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The court found that there was no evidence to rebut the presumption that Italy would comply with its obligations under EU laws or of special vulnerability in the personal circumstances of any of the Claimants, to support the assertion that Article 3 of the ECHR would be breached by the Claimants’ removal to Italy. 

The case concerns the interpretation of Directive 2004/83 and clarifies that the Irish legislation requiring seekers of international protection to follow two separate procedural stages: application for refugee status, and in case of refusal, application for subsidiary protection, is not contrary to EU law if the two applications can be introduced at the same time and if the application for subsidiary protection is considered within a reasonable period of time.

The right to good administration includes the right of any person to have his or her affairs handled impartially and within a reasonable period of time.

In the case of an individual benefiting from subsidiary protection according to the Qualification Directive, the non-fulfilment of the passport obligation cannot be taken into account in the exercising of discretion for the assessment of authorisation for access to employment.

The Supreme Court held that a person who is resisting a Dublin  transfer to the Member State responsible for processing the applicant's asylum claim need not show that there is a “systemic deficiency” in that Member State’s asylum system, rather that the conditions in that Member State would expose the person to inhumane and degrading treatment as prohibited by Article 3 ECHR. 

This case concerns whether it had been legal to apply exclusion clauses and refuse international protection for an applicant who was suspected of committing a serious crime. The Supreme Administrative Court concluded that subsidiary protection could be refused for a person who was suspected of committing aggravated rape.

‘Internal armed conflict’ in the context of international protection means armed groups confronting each other or the State armed forces, and is defined independently of international humanitarian law. No special conditions apply regarding intensity, organisation or duration of conflict.

A national decision maker must pay close attention to a United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) decision when determining an application for asylum. Such a decision does not create a presumption, however, substantive countervailing reasons are required to justify the decision maker coming to a different decision to the UNHCR.