Case summaries
When rejecting an application for international protection under the safe third country concept, Article 27 (2) (a) of the Procedures Directive needs to be taken into account. According to this article, the "connection" between the Applicant and the safe third country needs to be ascertained during the process.
“If an asylum applicant is shown to be in need, and if it can be expected that an applicant’s fundamental human rights and freedoms would or might be infringed, the administrative authority must give the applicant for asylum or subsidiary protection the benefit of the doubt in relation to the facts stated by the applicant.”
1. The issue as to whether an asylum-seeker was already protected against political persecution in a third country is only relevant in terms of the asylum application for recognition of refugee status in the context of the concept of the first country of asylum as defined in EU law in Article 29 of the Asylum Procedures Act (Articles 25 and 26 of the Asylum Procedures Directive).
2. If the Federal Office has reached a decision on the asylum application in this case, the substantive question of the subsidiarity of refugee protection in the assessment of refugee status is no longer applicable.
If there is a country that meets the criteria for being a 'safe third country', an asylum application may be rejected. If the application is not rejected, the examination must take place in accordance with the asylum-seeker's application, and the applicant may not be denied leave to remain with reference to a safe third country.
A Russian Federation citizen arrived in Finland from another EU country (Lithuania) where he/she alleged that he/she had been persecuted and claimed international protection on this basis. The Immigration Service denied the Applicant a residence permit, failed to examine the application for international protection and decided to deport him/her to Lithuania. The Immigration Service considered Lithuania to be a safe third country and the application for international protection was not examined in relation to his/her country of origin. The Supreme Administrative Court took the view that the issue of international protection could not be dealt with in Lithuania as the grounds for the application were cited as persecution in that same country. The Administrative Court was ordered to overturn the Immigration Service’s decision and return the case back for further consideration.
This case concerned the concept of ‘safe country’ within the Dublin system and respect for fundamental rights of asylum seekers. The Court held that EU law prevents the application of a conclusive presumption that Member States observe all the fundamental rights of the European Union. Art. 4 Charter must be interpreted as meaning that the Member States may not transfer an asylum seeker to the Member State responsible within the meaning of the Regulation where they cannot be unaware that systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedure and in the reception conditions of asylum seekers in that Member State amount to substantial grounds for believing that the asylum seeker would face a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of the provision. Once it is impossible to transfer the asylum seeker to the responsible Member State then subject to the sovereignty clause the State can check if another Member State is responsible by examining further criteria under the Regulation. This should not take an unreasonable amount of time and if necessary then the Member State concerned must examine the asylum application.
The Administrative Court considered the proposed removal of the applicant from the UK to Italy under the Dublin Regulation. In applying MSS v Belgium and Greece and KRS v UK to applications to resist removal under the Dublin Regulation on human rights grounds, a system which protects the rights of asylum seekers should be presumed in other EU member states. The evidence must reveal a systemic failure on a significant scale for the presumption to be rebutted. Particular weight would be given to the public statements of UNHCR and other intergovernmental bodies with appropriate mandates. Little or no weight would usually be given to expert reports in such cases.
Saudi Arabia is not considered a safe third country for non-Saudi nationals.
The Administrative Court considered the removal of a Sri Lankan from the UK to Cyprus under the Dublin Regulation. The applicant had been recognised under UNHCR’s mandate as being a refugee in Malaysia but had subsequently travelled via Thailand, Syria and Cyprus to the UK. The Court found that there was no legitimate expectation under the UK’s Mandate Refugee policy to consider his claim in the UK. Further, applying the principles in MSS v Belgium and Greece and KRS v UK, it found that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he faced a risk of onward refoulement from Cyprus to Sri Lanka or that detention conditions or living conditions in Cyprus should prevent his removal.
The applicant claimed asylum in November 2009 alleging a well founded fear of persecution for reasons of race and religion. The application was refused by the Ministry of Interior on the grounds that the application did not amount to persecution in accordance with the 1951 Refugee Convention. On appeal, the High National Court re-examined the application and held that the conflict which had arisen in the Ivory Coast had to be taken into account and on that basis subsidiary protection should be granted.