Case summaries
The presumption that Italy remains in compliance with its EU and International Law obligations related to the reception and integration of asylum seekers and Beneficiaries of International Protection has not been rebutted. Asylum seekers and BIPs suffering from severe psychological trauma can be returned to Italy with no real risk of breaching article 3 ECHR, or 4 CFREU, since the Country's reception capacities have not been exceeded, while effective medical treatment is available under the same terms as to Italian nationals.
In order to ensure that the state is capable of providing protection, the EU Qualification Directive stipulates that a state security system must be guaranteed and also requires an examination of the special circumstances of the individual case.
An applicant’s interest in remaining in a Member State pending a decision on their right to remain will prevail if, due to a lack of knowledge about the actual living situation of refugees in the third country and negative public reports regarding such situations, there can be no assurance that the applicant will be safe in said third country.
The case considered an application against the decision of the Secretary of State denying the Claimants a right of in-country appeal against the removal of the Claimants to Italy under the Dublin Regulation. The Claimants argued that their removal to Italy would expose them to a real risk of a breach of their rights under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The court found that there was no evidence to rebut the presumption that Italy would comply with its obligations under EU laws or of special vulnerability in the personal circumstances of any of the Claimants, to support the assertion that Article 3 of the ECHR would be breached by the Claimants’ removal to Italy.
The contested judgment is unconstitutional as it does not provide a clear way of assessing the jurisdiction of the third country when dealing with the application. It also reveals that the situation of the Applicant for international protection is unclear in the event that the application is rejected by the third country and the Applicant is not allowed to enter its territory, and shows that it is unclear as to what the Applicant can contest in this procedure.
An efficient legal system that would stop the extradition to a country in which the Applicant could be exposed to inhuman treatment has to have suspensive effect.
The interest of an applicant to obtain a temporary stay from deportation to Italy for the time being predominates, if the applicant, in case of his return back to Italy, would be threatened with serious damage to his health due to inadequate accommodation opportunities there and because medical care would not be guaranteed due to a permanent overstretch of resources.
The rules on safe third countries, according to which applications for international protection in the event of a threatened violation of Art 8 ECHR must not be refused on the basis of formal safety in another country, is to be applied similarly to the Dublin II Regulation. If the Applicant already has subsidiary protection in one Member State, in accordance with the Dublin II Regulation his application in a different State in which his son, who is a minor and entitled to asylum, is living, (in addition to the Applicant’s pregnant wife) must not be refused. On the contrary, this State must make use of the right to assume responsibility for the examination.
Ahmadis, for whom the practise and possibly also the promotion of their faith in public are elements which define their identity and as such are essential, are very likely to be at risk of political persecution in Pakistan. The “relationship consideration” demanded by the Federal Administrative Court, whereby the number of members of a particular group is compared with the number of actual threatening acts of persecution, seems virtually impossible in this case.
Applications for leave to remain were rejected as the Applicant had already been granted refugee status in another EU state. No grounds supporting an examination of the asylum applications in Sweden emerged in the case.
The Court refused to give two Applicants, who had both been granted asylum by the Czech Republic, permission to seek judicial review of the Refugee Applications Commissioner’s (ORAC) decisions not to admit their asylum claims for consideration on the basis of section 17(4) of the Refugee Act 1996, and also refused similar relief sought in respect of subsequent Deportation Orders, which it was claimed were unlawful owing to the unlawfulness of the former decisions regarding the Applicants’ asylum claims.
The relevant section precludes the Minister from granting a declaration of refugee status to persons who already have asylum pursuant to the Geneva Convention, and whose reason for seeking a declaration in Ireland does not relate to a fear of persecution in that state.
The Court held that they had not provided sufficient evidence that they had suffered or feared persecution for a Convention reason, and neither had they shown that they had taken any steps to avail of the protection of the laws or courts of the Czech Republic, nor provided a reasonable explanation as to why they did not do so.
Both Applicants were also formally refused an extension of time within which to bring their proceedings on the basis that (a) the criteria for the extension of time had not been met and (b) the substantive merits of their applications were insufficient to ground their applications seeking judicial review, even if they had been within time.