Case summaries
The case concerns the potential removal of a Syrian national of Armenian origin and Christian denomination from Greece to Türkiye under the EU-Türkiye Statement of 18 March 2026, following the rejection of his asylum claim on safe third country grounds. The Court struck out the Article 3 complaint concerning the risk of ill-treatment upon removal due to the cessation of risk. It found no violation of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 3 having regard to the multi-layered examination of the asylum claim and the reliance on the EU–Türkiye framework, assurances and supporting material, and held that the conditions of the applicant’s detention in a Greek police station amounted to a violation of Article 3 ECHR.
The return of a survivor of trafficking and gender-based violence to the country of original harm under the Dublin III Regulation violates Articles 2(d) and 6 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, unless the state conducts an individualized, trauma-informed, and gender-sensitive assessment of the real risk of retraumatization.
Relying on general assumptions about adequate reception conditions in the receiving state is insufficient where capacity gaps in specialized psychological care exist. The non-refoulement obligation requires assessing real, personal, and foreseeable risks of gender-based violence, including from non-state actors, and prohibits removal where formal legal protections cannot guarantee safety given the individual's extreme vulnerability.
Regarding the return of a Turkish applicant from Greece to Türkiye, her account constituted a prima facie case of refoulement, shifting the burden of proof to the Greek Government after evidentiary standards from secret detention cases were applied. The return of the applicant without any individual assessment or access to remedies, despite her asylum request and risk of ill-treatment due to alleged links to opposition movements in Türkiye, amounts to a violation of Articles 3 and 13 ECHR.
The applicant’s unregistered detention at a border guard station, without legal basis, information on the reasons for her arrest, or access to judicial review, as part of a broader Greek pattern of unlawful returns, amounts to a violation of Article 5(1), (2) and (4) ECHR. Although the applicant failed to prove a real risk to life or inhuman or degrading treatment during her removal process – where she travelled by an inflatable boat with other migrants –, the absence of an effective remedy to challenge such risks amounts to a violation of Article 13 ECHR.
States have a rigorous procedural obligation under Article 3 ECHR when assessing the risk of ill-treatment in a last minute asylum application submitted shortly before removal. Even where a subsequent application is made at a very late stage, domestic authorities cannot dismiss newly submitted documents as irrelevant due to lack of authenticity or translation without conducting any substantive assessment of their potential relevance in light of the applicant's individual circumstances and the general situation in the country of origin.
Detention beyond the period for which an individual would otherwise need to be detained pursuant to Schedule 2 § 16(1) for the purpose of an age assessment that will or doesn’t comply with applicable legal standards would be unlawful. Also, both common law and section 55 of the BCIA 2009 require a fair and careful process involving appropriate safeguards, which the Guidance doesn’t provide and is also inconsistent with the Secretary of State for the Home Department (SSHD) pre-existing polices.
The Committee clarified that an assessment of article 3(2) of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment requires an analysis of whether the individual concerned would be personally at a foreseeable real risk of being subjected to torture in the country to which he would be returned.
Moreover, when assessing an asylum claim, educational context, cultural context and mental welfare must be considered and where appropriate, expectations of the claimant’s ability to articulate and understand complex concepts readjusted. This is necessary to ensure the procedural safeguarding of the asylum application assessment process.
The State Secretariat of Migration (SSM) is obliged to assess the proportionality of a cessation measure in a case of a granted temporary residence in Switzerland. It was concluded that the cessation of temporary residence is not proportionate, when the applicant showed considerable efforts to integrate in the host community such as learning languages and practicing several internships to obtain a job in that country. His return would hamper all those integration efforts.
The CJEU ruled that Articles 14 and 34 of the Recast Qualifications Directive must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which provides that a failure to comply with the obligation to give a personal interview to an international protection’s applicant, before a decision is adopted, would lead to that application to be inadmissible.
The CJEU further concluded that it could only be allowed if the legislation gives the opportunity to the international protection’s applicant, in the appeal procedure, to set out in person all of his or her arguments against the decision in a hearing which complies with the applicable conditions and fundamental guarantees, under Article 15 of that Directive. The last condition would be, according to the ruling of the CJEU, that those arguments are not capable of altering that decision.
By not considering the argument on the applicants’ political conviction in Belgium and by avoiding answering the argument requesting a report on the Turkish authorities’ influence in Belgium, the Council for Alien Law Litigation failed to give a complete legal reasoning.
A court may dismiss the appeal without further proceedings in a non-public session, if the appeal does not depend on the solution of a legal question that is of fundamental significance.
In the case of an Afghan, the appeal does not depend on the solution of a fundamental question, if the lower instance has sufficiently examined the situation in the appellant’s country of origin. This is the case, if the court sufficiently considered possible internal flight alternatives by air.