Case summaries

The Court decides that the maximum period of detention for the purpose of removal of a person on the grounds of public policy or public security under Belgian law, according to which Union citizens and their family members are treated in the same way as third-country nationals subject to a return procedure, exceeds the principle of proportionality and thus does not comply with EU law.

The Court finds that third-country nationals without a valid residence title in a Member State are illegally present in that Member State and thus fall under the scope of the Return Directive, irrespective of the situation or the measures that led to the illegal presence of the person concerned. Against this backdrop, the Court holds that a deportation order cannot uphold an entry and residence ban without there being any return decision for the applicant which is thus incompatible with the Return Directive.

Member States are required to take due account of the best interests of the child before adopting a return decision accompanied by an entry ban, even where the person to whom that decision is addressed is not a minor but his or her father.

The Return Directive does not prevent a Member State from placing in administrative detention a third-country national residing illegally on its territory, in order to carry out the forced transfer of that national to another Member State in which that national has refugee status, where that national has refused to comply with the order to go to that other Member State and it is not possible to issue a return decision to him or her.

The automatic application of domestic provisions regulating expulsion following a criminal conviction may amount to a violation of Article 8 where the impact of the removal measure on the family and isses of proportionality are not sufficiently assessed. In this assessment, the best interests of the child should bear significant weight.

The State Secretariat of Migration (SSM) is obliged to assess the proportionality of a cessation measure in a case of a granted temporary residence in Switzerland. It was concluded that the cessation of temporary residence is not proportionate, when the applicant showed considerable efforts to integrate in the host community such as learning languages and practicing several internships to obtain a job in that country. His return would hamper all those integration efforts.

The Supreme Court of Ireland handed down a judgment concerning the question whether the Minister for Justice and Equality is obliged to revoke a deportation order or otherwise facilitate a person to enter the State, when that person has been granted consent to make a subsequent application for international protection under section 22 of the International Protection Act 2015, which requires the person's presence in the State to make the application. It was held that there is no express right to enter the State for the purposes of making an application, save where the person is at its frontiers.

The Return Directive does not preclude Member States from introducing legislation that imposes a custodial sentence on individuals for whom the return procedure has been exahusted but still remain in the territory, where the criminal act consists in an unlawful stay with notice of an entry ban, issued in particular on account of that third-country national’s criminal record or the threat he represents to public policy or national security.

However, such a provision in national legislation is permitted if the criminal act is not defined as a breach of such an entry ban and the legislation itself is sufficiently accessible, precise and foreseeable in its application in order to avoid all risk of arbitrariness.

The CJEU ruled that Articles 14 and 34 of the Recast Qualifications Directive must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which provides that a failure to comply with the obligation to give a personal interview to an international protection’s applicant, before a decision is adopted, would lead to that application to be inadmissible.

The CJEU further concluded that it could only be allowed if the legislation gives the opportunity to the international protection’s applicant, in the appeal procedure, to set out in person all of his or her arguments against the decision in a hearing which complies with the applicable conditions and fundamental guarantees, under Article 15 of that Directive. The last condition would be, according to the ruling of the CJEU, that those arguments are not capable of altering that decision.

The Court concluded that Italy had already accepted the take back request and therefore Portugal should proceed with the applicant’s transfer in accordance with the Dublin Regulation III. Since Italy had already rejected the applicant’s first request for international protection there, it should be the one responsible for returning the applicant back to their home country.

As the applicant is not a vulnerable person, the transfer order to Italy does not violate the non-refoulement principle.