Case summaries
The court found that a prohibition of deportation under Section 60 (2) of the Residence Act (corresponding to Art. 15 (b) of the Qualification Directive) was established due to the existence of a general risk of persecution in case of return to Syria. The Administrative Court, in their assessment of risk, went far beyond the prevailing case law, particularly that of the High Administrative Courts.
A particular mode of persecution cannot be detected in Syria due to the arbitrariness and the juxtaposition of different intelligence services, whose impact cannot be predicted.
A further deterioration of the situation has occurred in light of recent developments and the bloody suppression of the protest movements.
Currently even persons who have not been politically active in exile are, with considerable probability, at risk of being arrested on return, not only for a short period - they are also at risk of torture and other inhuman treatment.
The question of whether the current situation in Iraq is an internal armed conflict (nationwide or regionally) according to Section 60 (7) (2) Residence Act/Art. 15 (c) Qualification Directive was left open. Even if one assumes that such a conflict takes place, subsidiary protection is only to be granted if the applicant is exposed to a serious and individual threat to life or physical integrity “in the course of” such a conflict. This cannot be established regarding the applicant in the present case.
A foreigner who wishes to be placed under the special protection of refugee status must show the Administration, with reasonable clarity and in an objectively reasoned way, that there are specific facts which cause him to have a fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, social group or political opinion. If such substantive claims have not been submitted, but only general, vague or manifestly unfounded claims; or if specific facts have indeed been cited but these do not establish grounds for refugee status, then there is no obligation to give specific reasons for rejecting the application for asylum. The “Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status” issued by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees is non-binding in nature but contains “best practice” for the relevant authorities when examining asylum applications and, in that way, sets out “soft law”. Granting a residence permit on humanitarian grounds falls within the broad discretionary powers of the relevant authority; but it can, exceptionally, be obligatory if the foreigner would – should he be repatriated to the country of origin – be at risk of torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
This case concerned service of the initial negative decision against an asylum application where the notice was served on the foreign applicant asylum seeker without specifying the language in which the applicant was informed of its content. The court rejected an application for suspensive effect of the decision rejecting the asylum application in view of the pleas used by the applicant – of Palestinian origin – that he left his country for economic reasons, since there is no evidence that there is a risk of persecution should he return to Palestine, nor have any of the conditions for asylum on humanitarian grounds been met. The possible disruption to the lifestyle the applicant has created for himself whilst working in Greece does not constitute a reason to suspend any of the acts which form part of the asylum application examination procedure.
This case examined the compatibility of the Dublin II Regulation with the European Convention on Human Rights regarding transfers to Greece under the Dublin II Regulation. The Court found that there was a violation of Article 3 ECHR by the Greece Government because of the applicant’s conditions of detention, violation of Article 3 ECHR by Greece concerning the applicant’s living conditions in Greece, violation of Article 13 taken in conjunction with Article 3 ECHR against Greece because of the deficiencies in the asylum procedure followed in the applicant’s case and the risk of his expulsion to Afghanistan without any serious examination of the merits of his asylum application and without any access to an effective remedy. The Court also found in relation to Belgium that there was a violation of Article 3 by sending the applicant back to Greece and exposing him to risks linked to the deficiencies in the asylum procedure in that State, also held against Belgium a violation of Article 3 for sending him to Greece and exposing him to detention and living conditions there that were in breach of that ECHR article. The Court also found a violation of Article 13 ECHR taking in conjunction with Article 3 ECHR against Belgium.
Country of origin information can verify a situation in which the risk of persecution can exceptionally be considered to be proved without substantiating the personal circumstances of the applicant. The danger of the harm is real, and complies with the requirements of subsidiary protection.
The applicant’s claim for refugee status was rejected as Convention grounds were not established, however, subsidiary protection was granted in the alternative by the court on the basis of grave human rights violations and the prohibition of torture (Art 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)).
The court accepted the argument that by granting a lower protection status (tolerated status), even if the applicant qualifies for subsidiary protection, the asylum authority violates Art 15 (b) and (c) of the Qualification Directive (Art 61 (b) and (c) of the Asylum Act)
The applicant is not entitled to protection from deportation within the meaning of Section 60 (7) (2) of the Residence Act / Art 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive as the levels of indiscriminate violence in his home area are not characterised by a sufficient "density of danger".
The European Court of Human Rights held that the deportation of an Iranian national to Iran would give rise to a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.
The Helsinki Administrative Court found that a female minor from a town near Mogadishu was in need of subsidiary protection. The Court held that to return home the applicant would have to travel via Mogadishu which would place her at serious and personal risk due to the nature of the armed conflict.