Case summaries

The safe third country ground under Article 33(2)(c) of Directive 2013/32 is optional; an application may be declared inadmissible on that basis even if the applicant qualifies for international protection, but it cannot be rejected as unfounded on that ground.

Article 38 requires national law to define criteria establishing a sufficient connection between the applicant and the third country to make transfer reasonable.

Article 38(2)(b) and (c) of Directive 2013/32 permits reliance on publicly available sources and executive lists of safe third countries, provided that national law sets out a methodology for an individualised assessment of safety and allows the applicant to challenge the existence of the required connection.

Courts hearing appeals must verify the existence of such a connection, even if national law does not expressly grant that power.

The Committee against Torture decided that the removal of the complainant, a (former) Turkish national, from Sweden to Kosovo, where he would face a real risk of being forcibly transferred to and subjected to torture in Türkiye, would constitute a violation of article 3 of the Convention.

The Court found no violation of Article 8 ECHR took place as the requirements set out by the Swedish Temporary Restrictions Act were in line with the Family Reunification Directive and the European consensus. The balancing exercise was therefore performed correctly.

Article 4(1) of Directive 2004/83 requires the determining authority, under its duty of cooperation, to obtain up-to-date country of origin information and, where relevant, a medico-legal report on the applicant’s mental health; a breach of that duty does not automatically lead to annulment unless it may have affected the outcome.

Under Directive 2005/85, delays in the asylum procedure cannot be justified by legislative changes and, on their own, do not warrant setting aside a decision absent an impact on the outcome.

Article 4(5)(e) of Directive 2004/83 means that a false statement later explained and withdrawn at the first opportunity does not, by itself, undermine the applicant’s general credibility.

The Court of Justice held that defending personal interests against illegally acting non-state actors due to state corruption can be regarded as ‘political opinion’ under Directive 2011/95 if perceived as opposition by the persecuting actors.

The High Court found that the Tribunal failed to ask itself the correct legal questions when assessing the issue of state protection in the applicants’ country of origin.

In specific, the High Court found that the Tribunalfailed to apply the correct approach to the ‘state protection test’ found in section 31 of the International Protection Act, 2015, by not seeking to establish whether an effective system of protection is in place, which is non-temporary in nature and which involves the taking of reasonable steps to protect those who otherwise faced a real risk of persecution or serious harm.

The Federal Administrative Court found that Art. 3 of the Qualification Directive does not hinder Member States to allow parents and siblings, fulfilling the requirements for family members under Art. 2(j) of the Directive, to change their status of subsidiary protection into a refugee status which they derive from their minor sponsor.

The Court ruled that Palestinian refugees in the Gaza Strip can no longer count on the UNRWA’s protection or assistance. Therefore, the applicant does not fall within the scope of Article 1D of the Geneva Convention and must be recognized as a refugee. 

The Court of Justice held that Directive 2011/95 does not preclude a Member State from granting refugee status to a minor through one of his parents, even though there is no risk of persecution in case of removal to his country of nationality (Tunisia).

In this case the Upper Tribunal provided that the Refugee Convention doesn’t offer protection from social conservatism and that there is no protected right to enjoy a socially liberal lifestyle. However, the Convention may be considered to apply where  ‘westernisation’ reflects a protected characteristic such as political opinion or religious belief, or if there is a real risk that the individual in question would be unable to mask his westernisation and persecutors would impute such protected characteristics to him.