Case summaries

“The applicant bears the burden of the argument against the administrative authority, hereinafter referred to as the burden of proof. It is not, however, the duty of the asylum applicant to demonstrate his persecution by means other than his own credible testimony.”

“Where the testimony of an applicant for international protection submitted during proceedings can be identified as consistent and in accordance with the information available on the country of origin, in spite of minor inconsistencies, then such testimony must be relied on.”

When rejecting an application for international protection under the safe third country concept, Article 27 (2) (a) of the Procedures Directive needs to be taken into account. According to this article, the "connection" between the Applicant and the safe third country needs to be ascertained during the process. 

It is an administrative appeal brought before the High National Court against the Deputy Secretary of the Interior’s decision to dismiss the request to review the ruling which denied the claimant’s right to asylum.

The application for asylum was based on grounds of persecution as a result of the Applicant’s sexual orientation as a Cameroonian national.The application was rejected by the Ministry of the Interior as it was deemed that the claimant’s narrative did not portray personal persecution.

The High National Court reviewed the appeal and ruled that the State had not provided sufficient grounds to reject the validity and effectiveness of the documentation submitted by the Applicant.Therefore, the appeal was upheld and the claimant’s refugee status was recognised.

This case deals with whether an applicant, in a system where refugee status determination and subsidiary protection are examined separately, can require the administrative authorities in that State to supply them with the results of the assessment made in advance of a decision when it is proposed that such an application should be refused. The CJEU held that the obligation to cooperation under Article 4(1) of the Qualification Directive cannot be interpreted in that way but in such a separate system the fundamental rights of the Applicant must be respected and in particular the principle of the right to be heard.

When assessing the application for international protection the Ministry of Interior (MI) did not take into account the Applicant’s youth, lack of education and background. The MI did not conduct the procedure and pose questions in a manner that was suitable to the Applicant’s age and personality.

The country of origin information that the Applicant submitted only in his appeal against the decision should be accepted as this is generally available information that MI could have obtained on its own.

The Applicant left his country of origin (Iran) in 2003 having been arrested, illegally detained and tortured because of his participation in demonstrations against the regime in 1999. He told the Committee that he had occasionally participated in the anti-regime activities of Iranians in Greece, and that he did not wish to return to Iran because he feared that he would be imprisoned again and would be subjected to torture. Concerning his religious beliefs, he stated that he was an atheist. The Committee accepted that the torture suffered by the Applicant in his country of origin constituted previous persecution. However, the Committee believed that there was no a well-founded fear of persecution now or in the future because of his prior actions, nor because of his prior actions in conjunction with circumstances which occurred in Greece (participation in Iranian movements), nor even because of the Applicant's atheism and, therefore, that the fear of persecution was not well-founded. Nevertheless, the Committee acknowledged that “there may have been situations in which the Applicant was persecuted in the country of origin, but he has no present or future fear of persecution there. However, it is appropriate to recognise him as a refugee because of the compelling reasons arising from previous persecution, especially when the persecution he suffered was particularly atrocious”; and it unanimously recognised the Applicant's refugee status because it held that the Applicant had suffered terrible persecution in the past because of his anti-regime activities (political opinion) without the situation in his country of origin having since improved, and because the Applicant continued to suffer the consequences of his psychological harm, meaning that his return to Iran and his life there would be intolerable.

The case refers to an appeal to the Supreme Court brought by the appellant against the High National Court’s decision to reject the appellant’s administrative appeal against the denial of his application for refugee status. 

The appellant is a Columbian national and claims to fear political persecution if he is returned to his country because of threats from the FARC group (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia) due to the appellant’s refusal to permit two of his sons to join the armed group.

 The Supreme Court rejects the appeal, affirming the High National Court’s decision to deny asylum.Furthermore, the Supreme Court rejects the appeal for protection on the grounds of humanitarian considerations as contained in Spanish Law.   

The shifting of the burden of proof according to Article 4 (4) of the Qualification Directive applies if the Applicant refers to previous acts of persecution or threats as an indicator of the well-foundedness of his fear that persecution would resume if he were to return to his home country.

If it is assumed that the individual concerned was under immediate threat of persecution associated with his ethnicity when he left his home country, then the link is not simply with the ethnicity of the individual concerned (Chechen in this case), but also with the enmity generally expressed by the persecuting security forces against this ethnic group and their presumed political convictions.

The third action in a row brought by a foreign woman for refugee status ended in the issue of a judgment dismissing the case as it was found that the basis for the application was the same as in the previous cases and the application was therefore inadmissible. The Court overturned the negative decision by the Polish Council for Refugees, as the new application by the foreign woman stated that she had divorced her then husband and had been in a relationship for a year with a Polish citizen, which might cause persecution on religious grounds were she to return to her country of origin.

The Applicants' applications for asylum were rejected as they did not tell the truth about their former residence(s) before moving to Belgium, and it could therefore not be ruled out that they were also nationals of or enjoyed protection status in another country. However, they could not be deported to Afghanistan, even though it was at least established that they were Afghan nationals.