Case summaries
The removal of the author to Greece would amount to a breach of Articles 2 (c)-(f), 3, and 12 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, because the Swiss authorities failed to consider her vulnerable status as a survivor of gender-based violence (GBV) and the real, personal, and foreseeable risk that the author would face as an unaccompanied victim of such violence and suffering from PTSD and depression.
The return of a survivor of trafficking and gender-based violence to the country of original harm under the Dublin III Regulation violates Articles 2(d) and 6 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, unless the state conducts an individualized, trauma-informed, and gender-sensitive assessment of the real risk of retraumatization.
Relying on general assumptions about adequate reception conditions in the receiving state is insufficient where capacity gaps in specialized psychological care exist. The non-refoulement obligation requires assessing real, personal, and foreseeable risks of gender-based violence, including from non-state actors, and prohibits removal where formal legal protections cannot guarantee safety given the individual's extreme vulnerability.
The Committee found that there were serious risks concerning the applicant’s situation that justify a more thorough examination than the simple summary assessment by the Federal Administrative Court. The absence of an effective, independent and impartial review of the decision constitutes a breach of the procedural obligations under Article 3 of the Convention.
National legislation that grants the possibility of rejecting an application made by a third-country national or a stateless person for international protection, whose previous application seeking refugee status in another Member State implementing the Dublin III Regulation had been rejected, is precluded under Article 33(2)(d) of Directive 2013/32 read in conjunction with Article 2(q) thereof.
Article 27(1) of Dublin III Regulation read in the light of recital 19 thereof, and Article 47 of the Charter preclude national legislation that bars domestic courts from assessing an application for annulment of a Dublin transfer decision by considering circumstances that emerged after the transfer decision was adopted and which are decisive for the correct application of the regulation. However, such circumstances may not be considered if that legislation foresees a specific remedy with ex nunc review that can be exercised after the emergence of the new circumstances is not conditional on the person’s deprivation of liberty or on the imminent implementation of that decision.
As an extraneous consideration, the Coronavirus pandemic does not justify the suspension of the implementation of Dublin transfer decisions. The de facto suspension of Dublin transfers due to the Coronavirus pandemic does not interrupt the time limit for the implementation of Dublin transfer decisions.
A change of the Member State responsible based on the expiration of the time limit for transfer does not depend on the accountability of the requesting Member State for the impossibility to carry out the transfer.
The CJEU ruled that Articles 14 and 34 of the Recast Qualifications Directive must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which provides that a failure to comply with the obligation to give a personal interview to an international protection’s applicant, before a decision is adopted, would lead to that application to be inadmissible.
The CJEU further concluded that it could only be allowed if the legislation gives the opportunity to the international protection’s applicant, in the appeal procedure, to set out in person all of his or her arguments against the decision in a hearing which complies with the applicable conditions and fundamental guarantees, under Article 15 of that Directive. The last condition would be, according to the ruling of the CJEU, that those arguments are not capable of altering that decision.
The Court concluded that Italy had already accepted the take back request and therefore Portugal should proceed with the applicant’s transfer in accordance with the Dublin Regulation III. Since Italy had already rejected the applicant’s first request for international protection there, it should be the one responsible for returning the applicant back to their home country.
As the applicant is not a vulnerable person, the transfer order to Italy does not violate the non-refoulement principle.
Since there is a high risk of exposure to inhuman and degrading treatment under Article 3 ECHR and Article 4 CFREU, Portugal should not allow the applicant’s transfer to Italy. The Court also found that there had been a violation of his right to a prior hearing, and that there is no obligation under EU Law of asylum seekers’ transfer once the DRIII is applied.
Germany is responsible for the asylum determination of an oppositional Turkish applicant under Art. 3 para. 2 subparas 2 and 3 Dublin III Regulation, because in this individual case the Bulgarian asylum procedure has systemic flaws that would entail a risk of inhuman or degrading treatment. A serious examination of the asylum application cannot be expected by the Bulgarian authorities and the authorities will likely return the applicant to Turkey. In such a case, there are reasonable grounds for believing that there would be a violation of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights due to the complainant’s own or family member’s opposition activities.