Case summaries

This case involved recognition of refugee status under Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention on grounds of religious beliefs.

More specifically, it was held that the arrest and torture the Applicant suffered at the hands of his father and the State authorities because of his Christian faith, the risk of being executed for apostasy because he was baptised in Greece, and the risk of being arrested and maltreated again should he return to Iran, constituted persecution under Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention, the actor of persecution being the State. Furthermore, being forced to conceal one's religious beliefs and/or proclaim belief in another religionin order to avoid persecution and/or deprivation of basic rights constitutes a breach of religious freedom under Article 9 of the ECHR and also the related case law of the ECtHR.

Establishing  that an asylum seeker is unconvincing is a matter of assessing the evidence, which can only take place when reaching a decision. The competent authority for international protection is not obliged to notify the Applicant in advance regarding its assessment of the evidence. 

Paragraph 9 of Article 23 of the International Protection Act stipulates that when assessing an application for international protection the Ministry of the Interior (MI) needs to take into account the specific information on the country of origin that is connected exclusively to the matter at hand. This can also include the manner of enforcing laws and other regulations in the country of origin. The fact that the Applicant participated in the protests is indisputable, thus the MI should have obtained specific information on whether Iranian legislation defines participation in protests and getting involved in a confrontation with security forces as an act that could lead to persecution.  

The exclusion of a person who had belonged to a terrorist organisation depended on a personal examination to see whether there were genuine grounds to attribute to him a personal responsibility as organiser, author or accomplice to serious crimes under ordinary law or actions contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

It is the duty of the administrative authority to establish all of the facts that are important in a procedure, and thus to complete the background information for a decision to the extent that it forms a reliable basis for the decision-making itself.

The administrative authority is not relieved of this duty even with regard to the provisions of Section 34(3) of Act No 71/1967 Coll. on administrative procedure (hereinafter the “Administrative Procedure Code“), according to which the participants in a procedure must put forward the evidence that is known to them in support of their claims. 

Although the asylum seeker has been unable to offer any credible account of the death penalty allegedly imposed on him due to his homosexuality, it must nevertheless be assessed whether, he has grounds to fear persecution or is in real danger of suffering serious harm in his home country due to his sexual orientation, and what weight must be given to the fact that he must hide his homosexuality to avoid this kind of threat. The judgments of the Administrative Court and the Immigration Service were overturned and the case was returned to the Immigration Service for further consideration. 

1. If an Iranian national is declined the opportunity to obtain a school-leaving certificate and attend a state school because of the refusal by Iranian authorities to issue him with identity papers, this constitutes a significant discriminatory administrative measure according to Article 9 paragraph 2 of the Qualification Directive.

 
2. The right to suitable education corresponding to a child’s abilities is recognised as a human right according to international law.

A Muslim asylum seeker and his/her spouse joined Jehovah’s Witnesses in Finland – a religious community.  In their home country, Iran, converting away from Islam can mean a death sentence.  The Administrative Court should not have been allowed to deny the application without an oral hearing in which further information could have been given regarding the Applicants’ conversion to Christianity and the consequences thereof in their home country.

This case concerned the concept of ‘safe country’ within the Dublin system and respect for fundamental rights of asylum seekers. The Court held that EU law prevents the application of a conclusive presumption that Member States observe all the fundamental rights of the European Union. Art. 4 Charter must be interpreted as meaning that the Member States may not transfer an asylum seeker to the Member State responsible within the meaning of the Regulation where they cannot be unaware that systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedure and in the reception conditions of asylum seekers in that Member State amount to substantial grounds for believing that the asylum seeker would face a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of the provision. Once it is impossible to transfer the asylum seeker to the responsible Member State then subject to the sovereignty clause the State can check if another Member State is responsible by examining further criteria under the Regulation. This should not take an unreasonable amount of time and if necessary then the Member State concerned must examine the asylum application. 

The case involved the rejection of an asylum application by an Iranian citizen of Kurdish origins who cited a fear of persecution because of his religious opinions and, specifically, having become a Christian. In support of his claims he submitted his baptism certificate and invoked the punishment stipulated by the legal system in his country of origin for changing his religion. The Minister for Public Order's decision on the party's application was annulled for being insufficiently reasoned.

The applicant, from Iran, had not been politically active in Iran but participated in demonstrations in Sweden and appeared with his photo on dissident websites and TV. The applicant was considered to have been engaged in low-level political activity. Thus, he was deemed not to be of interest to the Iranian authorities and was therefore not considered to be a refugee or in need of subsidiary protection on “sur place” grounds.