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On 1 October 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered its judgment in Case C-249/25 (Jilin), following a request for a preliminary ruling from the Netherlands Council of State (Raad van State). The case concerned the interpretation of Article 17(2) of Directive 2001/55/EC (the Temporary Protection Directive (TPD)) and Article 31 of Directive 2013/32/EU (the recast Asylum Procedures Directive (rAPD)), and whether Member States may automatically suspend the examination of applications for international protection lodged by beneficiaries of temporary protection until that protection expires.

The Court clarified that Article 17(2) TPD provides that the examination of any asylum application not processed before the end of the period of temporary protection shall be completed after the end of that period. However, that provision does not confer on Member States the power to automatically suspend the examination of applications for international protection during the period of temporary protection.

It further held that beneficiaries of temporary protection are not excluded from the scope of Directive 2011/95/EU (the recast Qualification Directive) and Directive 2013/32/EU (rAPD).  The general rules for examining applications for international protection, including the time limits under Article 31 rAPD apply, in principle, regardless of whether the applicant enjoys temporary protection. Furthermore, Article 31 rAPD already allows Member States, under certain circumstances, to extend the time limit for examining applications where their international protection systems face increased pressure. Therefore, the EU legislature already took account of the administrative difficulties arising from a large number of applications lodged simultaneously.

The Court further rejected the argument that a generalised and automatic suspension is necessary to achieve the TPD’s objectives. Temporary protection provides immediate, more limited protection while preserving access to international protection following an individual examination. Its implementation does not necessarily mean that national asylum systems face more applications than they can handle, while automatic suspension could leave authorities having to examine numerous applications simultaneously when temporary protection ends.

Finally, it accepted that exceptionally, the lodging of a considerable number of applications over a short period may make it objectively impossible for the Member States to comply with the time limits of Article 31 rAPD. In such circumstances, authorities may temporarily defer the examination of some applications, even if the applicable time limits cannot always be met. It is for the national courts to verify that any failure to meet the time limits does not result from a generalised and automatic suspension, but only from measures necessary to deal with such an impossibility while avoiding the congestion of the national international protection system.

On 22 July 2026, the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) delivered its decision in case 2 BvR 319/26, concerning the withdrawal of admission commitments previously issued to Afghan nationals under Germany’s humanitarian admission programme “Human Rights List”.

In September 2021, the Federal Ministry of the Interior informed the complainants that they would be admitted to Germany under § 22 sentence 2 of the Residence Act (AufenthG). Following the decision of the new German Government to terminate the voluntary admission programmes, including those concerning Afghanistan, the Federal Ministry of the Interior declared approximately 640 admission commitments issued under the Human Rights List and the bridging programme “invalid and expired”, without carrying out an individual assessment. On that basis, the complainants’ visa applications were subsequently rejected.

The Federal Constitutional Court held that, although the complainants did not have a constitutional right to the requested visas, the blanket withdrawal of their admission commitments violated the prohibition of arbitrariness under Article 3(1), read in conjunction with Article 20(3), of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz). It recognised that the Ministry enjoys broad political discretion in deciding whether to maintain or withdraw an admission commitment. However, once an admission commitment concerning a specific individual has been communicated to that person, this discretion is narrowed and the authorities must take their individual circumstances and interests into account before withdrawing it.

The Court therefore overturned the decision of the Higher Administrative Court and referred the case back for a new decision. It clarified that the Ministry may still withdraw the admission commitments, provided that it does so following an individual assessment in accordance with the constitutional prohibition of arbitrariness. The Court further held that Germany must continue supporting the complainants in Pakistan until either a visa is granted or the Ministry adopts a constitutionally compliant decision withdrawing their admission commitments.

On 4 June 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union delivered its judgment in Case C‑198/25  (Quotal), originating from a request for a preliminary ruling by the District Court of The Hague, sitting in Zwolle (rechtbank Den Haag, zittingsplaats Zwolle). The case concerned the interpretation of Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32/EU (the recast ‘Asylum Procedures Directive’ (rAPD)), read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union on whether a first-instance court hearing an appeal against a rejection of an application for international protection is able to fully reassess the merits of the application, or whether that assessment may be reserved to the determining authority.

The Court recalled that Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32 requires Member States to ensure that a first-instance court or tribunal before which a decision relating to an application for international protection is contested, carries out a full and ex nunc examination of both facts and points of law. The review must allow an up-to-date assessment of the case, taking into account all necessary factual and legal elements, including any evidence arising after the adoption of the decision under appeal. The Court clarified that such an examination allows the application to be dealt exhaustively at judicial level, without the need to refer the case back to the determining authority.

It further held that Article 46(3) confers on the first-instance court or tribunal, where it has all necessary elements of fact and law, the power to give a binding ruling on whether the applicant satisfies the conditions for international protection. Under EU law Member States may not restrict the scope of that judicial review. 

Finally, the Court held that national courts must set aside any national legislative provisions that prevent EU rules from producing their full effect. It therefore clarified that Article 46(3) requires a system of judicial protection in which first-instance courts or tribunals are empowered to carry out a full and up-to-date factual reassessment of the application for international protection and, where they have all necessary elements, to give a binding ruling on the merits of the claim, including the grant of international protection, thereby ensuring the effectiveness of EU law.

On 9 February 2026, the Swiss Federal Administrative Court (FAC) delivered the judgment no. D-4601/2025 clarifying the scope of the principle of subsidiarity in the context of temporary protection for persons from Ukraine. The case concerned the refusal by the State Secretariat for Migration (SEM) to grant temporary protection in Switzerland to a Ukrainian national who had previously benefited from temporary protection in Italy.

The applicant had obtained temporary protection in Italy in March 2022, which remained valid until March 2023, and thereafter she returned to Ukraine. In April 2025, she entered Switzerland and applied for temporary protection. The SEM rejected her application and ordered her removal, considering that she could rely on protection previously granted in Italy. The applicant challenged this decision, arguing that her Italian protection status had expired and that Switzerland should have sought assurances of readmission from Italy before refusing protection. The Federal Administrative Court (FAC) dismissed the appeal and confirmed that, under the principle of subsidiarity, temporary protection in Switzerland may be refused where the applicant already has, or can reasonably obtain, a valid protection status in an EU/EFTA Member State. It clarified that no formal readmission agreement or prior assurance from the other State is required in such circumstances.

The Court found that Italy constituted a valid alternative protection country, as it had granted the applicant temporary protection equivalent to the Swiss “S” status and remains obliged under EU law to continue providing such protection to Ukrainian nationals. The expiry of the applicant’s previous Italian status, resulting from her voluntary departure, did not alter this assessment, as she could lawfully return and reobtain protection in Italy. Accordingly, the Court held that the existence of a valid alternative protection status excludes entitlement to Swiss temporary protection, without the need for prior confirmation of readmission, provided that the person concerned can lawfully return to the third State. The judgment was final and not subject to appeal before the Swiss Federal Supreme Court.
 

Unofficial translation by the EWLU team

We would like to thank Helen Zemp for bringing this case to our attention

On 19 March 2026, the Administrative Court of First Instance of Thessaloniki published a decision referring a preliminary question to the CJEU regarding the interpretation of Article 46 of Directive 2013/32 (the Asylum Procedures Directive – APD). The case concerned an application for annulment lodged by a Guinean national against a decision of the Appeals Committee which had rejected his asylum appeal as inadmissible due to late submission.

The applicant applied for international protection in 2018, but his application was rejected at first instance. He promptly requested free legal aid and a lawyer was appointed, however, his appeal was lodged after the statutory deadline, and the Appeals Committee dismissed the appeal as inadmissible. Before the Administrative Court, the applicant argued that the late submission was not attributable to him but to failures in the provision of legal aid and claimed he was deprived of an effective remedy, in breach of Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and Article 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

The Court reviewed the EU and national legal framework and noted that while national law provides strict deadlines for appeals, these must not render the exercise of the right to an effective remedy impossible or excessively difficult. It also acknowledged the established national case law that, in principle, applicants bear the consequences of their lawyer’s errors, unless force majeure is established. According to domestic case law, force majeure does not include negligence on behalf of an appointed lawyer that results in missed deadlines. However, the Court identified a legal uncertainty as to whether this approach is compatible with EU law in situations where the legal representative is appointed by the State and the applicant has acted diligently.

Considering the importance of the right to an effective remedy and the potential consequences for asylum seekers, including the risk of refoulement, the Court decided to refer the following preliminary question to the Court of Justice of the European Union:

“Is it compatible with Article 46 of Directive 2013/32/EU and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to reject, pursuant to Articles 92(1)(a) and 95(8) of Law 4636/2019, an administrative appeal against a first-instance decision rejecting an application for international protection, due to late submission? Such rejection occurs in a situation where the requirements laid down in Article 71 of Law 4636/2019 (Articles 19 to 23 of the Directive) and in the implementing Ministerial Decision No 3449/2021 have not been complied with, namely the obligation to inform the appellant of the lawyer appointed to their case, to ensure communication between the appellant and that lawyer, and where the latter has not handled the case with the required diligence under Article 5 of that Ministerial Decision.  More specifically, it concerns  a case where, although the appellant requested within the statutory time limit the appointment of a lawyer by the Asylum Service to assist them and demonstrated due diligence in pursuing their case and in taking the necessary steps for the proper lodging of the appeal, the lawyer appointed by the Service failed to communicate with the applicant and to lodge the appeal in due time, without any proven case of force majeure affecting the lawyer?”

Unofficial translation by the EWLU team
EWLU team would like to thank Equal Legal Aid for bringing this case to our attention