Case summaries

The State Secretariat for Migration (SEM) must carry out an individualised examination to determine whether there are substantial grounds for believing that the asylum procedure of the Member State where the applicant shall be transferred to has systemic weaknesses that would entail a risk of inhuman treatment or chain deportation.

The transfer of a family to the previous country of entry (Bulgaria), which might entail the risk of refoulement to the country of origin (Afghanistan), would cause an irreversible and serious harm; it ordered the suspension of the transfer decision until the final decision, on the annulment of the rejection of the application on the refugee status, was issued.

The Court decides that Greece is responsible for the examination of the applicant’s claim for international protection. The Court does not find that asylum procedures in Greece are flawed and that the applicant will be exposed to inhuman and degrading reception conditions. Moreover, neither the fact that the applicant’s sister is living in Germany nor the purpose of medical and psychological support in a Member State entitles the applicant under the Dublin Regulation to choose which country will examine his application for international protection.

The CJEU ruled that a third-country national who lodged an application for international protection in a first Member State, then left and subsequently lodged a new application in a second Member State is not entitled to rely, in an action brought under Article 27(1) DRIII in that second Member State against a decision to transfer them, on the criterion for defining responsibility stablished in Article 9.  To conclude otherwise would not be in conformity with the Regulation’s general purpose to prevent secondary movements of individuals and the principle that an application for international protection must be assessed by a single Member State.

The CJEU also concluded that in the cases referred to in Article 20(5) DRIII, a possible transfer could occur without previously having been established that the requested Member State is responsible for examining the application. This is because the exercise of a take back request does not presume the responsibility of the requested Member State to examine the application, but that that Member State satisfies the conditions laid down in Article 20(5) or 18(1) (b) to (d). Adding to that, in a situation covered by Article 20(5), a Member State cannot issue a take back request when the applicant has provided reliable information establishing that that Member State must be regarded as responsible for the application.

There is a case of urgent necessity concerning interim measures according to § 123 VwGO obliging a Member State to accept a take charge request regarding  the asylum applications of family members of a person entitled to subsidiary protection in that state when the decision on an asylum application of these family members is imminent in the requesting state. 

Neither Austrian law nor the provisions of the Dublin III Regulation provide for legal remedies against a Member State’s rejection of a request for admission. The Dublin Regulation provides for a remonstration procedure between the Member States concerned in the event of a rejection, whereby after expiry of the remonstration period the requesting Member State is finally responsible for examining the application for international protection. A later agreement after the remonstration period has expired cannot establish any responsibility.

The CJEU ruled that an asylum applicant may not be transferred under the Dublin III Regulation to the Member State responsible for processing their application if the living conditions would expose them to a situation of extreme material poverty amounting to inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 CFR. In this regard, the Court held that the threshold was only met where such deficiencies attained a particularly high level of severity beyond a high degree of insecurity or significant degradation of living conditions. Correspondingly, national courts had the obligation to examine, based on information that is objective, reliable, specific and properly updated and having regard to the standard of protection of fundamental rights guaranteed by EU law, whether there was a real risk for the applicant to find himself in such situation of extreme material poverty.

An act of absconding withing the meaning of Dublin III may be presumed when the applicant has left the accommodation allocated to them without informing the competent authorities, provided that they have been informed of this obligation, unless the applicant provides valid reasons for not informing the authorities. 

The CJEU ruled that an asylum seeker may not be transferred to the Member State that has previously granted him international protection if such living conditions would expose the applicant to a situation of extreme material poverty. The threshold was only met where such deficiencies attained a particularly high level of severity, going beyond a high degree of insecurity or significant degradation of living conditions.

The Court further clarified that this threshold also applied where there were infringements of the provisions of the Qualification Directive, including the level of the subsistence allowance granted to beneficiaries of subsidiary protection. 

Lastly, the CJEU added that the fact that the Member State that granted subsidiary protection systematically refuses, without real examination, to grant refugee status does not prevent the other Member States from rejecting a further application submitted to them by the person concerned as being inadmissible.

The notification about the intention of withdrawal from the EU by the Member-State responsible for the examination of the application for international protection does not trigger the determining Member-State’s obligation to make use of the discretionary clause of Article 17(1) 604/2013 EU. Similarly, Article 6 (1) cannot be interpreted as imposing an obligation on the Member State that is not responsible to take into account the best interests of the child and to examine the application itself under 17 (1)

The extension of the transfer period in accordance with Art. 29 para. 2 sentence 2 Dublin Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013 (Dublin III Regulation) requires that the asylum applicant absconds, which has to be proven by the transferring authority.

Absconding is only the case, if the asylum applicant cannot be reached by the competent authorities for an (undefined) longer period of time. The intention to evade the authorities does not have to be proven. The circumstances of the individual case are decisive.