Case summaries

The case involves analysis of Art 5 of the Qualification directive. The applicant converted to Christianity in Ireland.

The Court stated that when analysing the behaviour of an applicant in the country of asylum, in this case conversion to Christianity, the issue is how such behaviour would be considered in the country of origin. Also, that while the state is entitled to view some claims based on sur place activities with a heightened degree of scepticism, the question involves whether, objectively, the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution.

The Court granted leave to the applicant for judicial review of the decision of the Minister for Justice to issue a deportation order.

In the opinion of the appeal court, the fact that the defendant disregarded the documents submitted by the applicant in support of his request for an application of Article 3(2) of the Dublin Regulation, and omitted to present an argument in the decision as to why it had not upheld the application, fails to satisfy the requirements of the generally accepted legal principles of administrative procedure, because the outcomes of these actions were not assessed and justified in the decision.

The case considered whether the security situation in central-Iraq, and particularly in Baghdad, met the prerequisites for granting a residence permit on the grounds of subsidiary protection. It was confirmed that the need for international protection must be evaluated not only on points of law but also on points of fact. Both the applicant’s account of prior events in the country of origin, as well as current country of origin information regarding the security situation, must be taken into account in the risk assessment. As such, the evaluation is tied to a particular individual and to a particular time and place.

Country of origin information can verify a situation in which the risk of persecution can exceptionally be considered to be proved without substantiating the personal circumstances of the applicant. The danger of the harm is real, and complies with the requirements of subsidiary protection.

The applicant’s claim for refugee status was rejected as Convention grounds were not established, however, subsidiary protection was granted in the alternative by the court on the basis of grave human rights violations and the prohibition of torture (Art 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)).

The court accepted the argument that by granting a lower protection status (tolerated status), even if the applicant qualifies for subsidiary protection, the asylum authority violates Art 15 (b) and (c) of the Qualification Directive (Art 61 (b) and (c) of the Asylum Act)

The Court considered how to assess whether an applicant’s activities for insurgent groups in Afghanistan could constitute terrorism. It further considered whether attacks upon United Nations Security Council mandated forces, such as ISAF in Afghanistan, were acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations, justifying exclusion from the 1951 Refugee Convention under Article 1F(c).

A transfer to Greece within the framework of the Dublin Regulation was stopped due to the conditions for asylum seekers in the country.

When medico-legal evidence of torture is provided by specialists and found credible it is incumbent on the Migration Board to put forward evidence that there is no further risk of torture in the relevant country. 

For conversion to be considered an acceptable protection ground the religious belief must be genuine.

Converts to Christianity in Afghanistan face a general risk of persecution and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment on return. However, the Migration Court of Appeal found that an Afghan applicant did not prove it was reasonably likely that his conversion from Islam to Christianity was founded on a genuine belief. He had not shown that if he returned to his country of origin he had the intention to live as a convert. There was also no evidence that the authorities in his country of origin knew that he had converted.

In assessing state protection, a judge must look, notwithstanding a general sufficiency of protection in a country, to the individual circumstances of the applicant. In assessing whether an appellant’s individual circumstances give rise to a need for additional protection, account must be taken of past persecution (if any) so as to ensure the question posed is whether there are good reasons to consider that such persecution (and past lack of sufficient protection) will not be repeated. When considering whether past persecution is a serious indication of a well founded fear under Article 4(4) of the Qualification Directive, Recital 27 to the Directive indicated that the past ill treatment of family members was also relevant.