Case summaries

Application for annulment of a decision by the Minister of Public Order 

The contested ministerial decision, which held that the applicant's application for recognition as a refugee should be rejected because  threats emanating from non-state actors do not constitute a well-founded fear of persecution within the meaning of the 1951 Convention, is in direct violation of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention.

Rejection of an extradition request by Azerbaijan in a case where the wanted person had been recognised as a refugee by Germany. Azerbaijan's request for extradition because of acts contrary to common criminal law was a premise aimed at stifling the wanted person's political opposition to the extraditing country's government. Azerbaijan was requesting extradition for political reasons.

In the conditions which currently prevail in some rural areas in Eastern Turkey, the attitude of women of Kurdish origin who want to escape from a forced marriage is perceived by society and the authorities as an infringement of their customs, these women are therefore subjected to persecution committed with the assent of the population. Women who refuse forced marriage in these areas form a group whose members, by reasons of common characteristics which define them in the eyes of Turkish society, are likely to face persecution against which the authorities are unable to provide protection.

This decision upheld the decision of the District Court in J. as regards the legal inadmissibility of extraditing a foreigner. The decision to accord refugee status was taken by a competent French authority and is binding within the territory of Poland, where the foreigner, who is sought by the Russian authorities, was detained. Poland recognises the decisions of other states to accord refugee status to foreigners and grants such foreigners the same degree and scope of legal protection as it would in the case of a foreigner granted protection by a competent Polish authority.

Having regard to the security situation which prevailed in the area of Chlef, the CRR did not consider that the Algerian authorities were, at the time, able to provide protection against the persecution inflicted by Islamic armed groups. Furthermore, given the impossibility of finding employment and the constant fear of being forcibly returned to this area, it was not reasonable to consider that Algiers constituted an internal protection alternative.

The judgment defined a particular social group as a group of persons that objectively share common characteristics or who at least are perceived to do so by society. This characteristic is often of an innate and unchangeable nature or is otherwise fundamental to human identity, conscience or to the exercise of those particular persons’ human rights. This characteristic cannot be constituted by the risk of persecution itself.

If any fact emerges during the interview, which indicates that the applicant could be persecuted for exercising his political rights and freedoms, or has a well-founded fear of being persecuted on the grounds upon which asylum can be granted, the Ministry of Interior obliged to conduct the interview in a way that would achieve an outcome which is sufficiently clear for the needs of considering the asylum claim. It is also necessary to evaluate the way in which state power is exercised in the country of origin, and the real possibility of exercising one’s political rights and other circumstances that could establish grounds for international protection.

Belonging to a group of people without power or influence does not constitute a particular social group and therefore cannot be deemed a convention ground for persecution under the Refugee Convention. 

The Court of Appeal gave guidance on the relevant factors to consider in assessing claims for protection against persecution from non-state actors under the Refugee Convention and Article 3 of the ECHR.

The 1951 Refugee Convention does not provide protection in respect of claims of conscientious objectors who feared imprisonment for their refusal to undertake military service where there is no alternative service offered in national law. This was the position even if that objection is to all forms of military service and is absolute. The right to conscientious objection was not yet protected in international human rights law and was yet to emerge as a principle of customary international law. A claim may succeed if the applicant would be required, in the course of military service, to conduct military action that breached the basic rules of human conduct or if the punishment they would receive for refusal to serve was discriminatory or disproportionate. Secondly, when assessing whether persecution was “for” a Convention reason the decision-maker should ask the question of “what was the real reason for the persecution?”. The decision-maker should not limit the enquiry to the persecutor’s motivation but should look for the effective reason or reasons.