Case summaries

The administrative detention of an Afghan national was imposed on the basis of a procedural error due  to the lack of relevant documentation and unjustified information by the French authorities (Prefect and Prosecutor).

In order to guarantee that an applicant for international protection has an effective judicial remedy within the meaning of Article 47 of the Charter, a national court or tribunal is required to vary a decision of the first-instance determining body that does not comply with its previous judgment. The court or tribunal must substitute its own decision on the application for international protection by disapplying, if necessary, the national law that prohibits it from proceeding in that way.  

A Guinean woman who has been forced into marriage at a young age and subsequently harassed into marrying her late husband’s brother, is a refugee under article 1, section A §2 of the Geneva Convention. She risks being persecuted by reason of her membership in the social group of women, and considering the regular violation of women’s rights occuring in Guinea.

The CJEU ruled on whether an individual could appeal a decision which refused refugee status but granted subsidiary protection status, even if the rights and benefits afforded by each international protection status are identical in national law.

A Member State is not required to issue a decision on its own responsibility under Dublin III when, in its capacity as the determining Member State, it found that there is no sufficient evidence to establish responsibility of another Member State. Domestic courts do not have to examine the application of the Dublin criteria ex proprio motu in the context of a review of the rejection of an application for international protection.

Religion is a broad concept that encompasses both internal elements of faith and an external component of manifestation. The applicant does not have to provide documentation and make statements on both elements but has to cooperate with the authorities and substantiate the reasons that his claim of persecution on the grounds of religion is true. The provision of the death penalty in national legislation could constitute an “act of persecution” on its own, provided that the penalty is actually enforced and regardless of whether the measure is considered important for reasons of public order in that country of origin.

CJEU rules on the correct processing of applications for international protection lodged separately by family members and the interrelationship between them.

The CJEU ruled on  the scope of the right to an effective remedy provided for in Article 46 of the (Recast) Asylum Procedures Directive and in Article 13 of the Returns Directive.

Where a person is registered with UNRWA and then later applies for international protection in a European Union Member State such persons are in principle excluded from refugee status in the European Union unless it becomes evident, on the basis of an individualised assessment of all relevant evidence, that their personal safety is at serious risk and it is impossible for UNRWA to guarantee that the living conditions are compatible with its mission and that due to these circumstances the individual has been forced to leave the UNRWA area of operations. 

A Member State cannot rely on the rebuttable presumption under Articles 36 and 37 of the 2013 Asylum Procedures Directive (APD) in respect of the safe country of origin concept and subsequently find the application to be manifestly unfounded in accordance with Article 31(8)(b) without having fully implemented and complied with the procedures under the APD relating to the designation of countries as safe countries of origin.

Moreover, a Member State may not consider an application for asylum as manifestly unfounded under the APD due to the insufficiency of the applicant’s representations.