Case summaries
Even if it is assumed that an internal armed conflict is taking place, a serious individual risk can only be established if the degree of indiscriminate violence which is characteristic of the conflict has reached such a high level that any civilian is at risk of a serious individual threat simply by his or her presence in the region.
The suicide attacks and bombings typical of Iraq and also of the hometown of the applicants can be classified as acts of indiscriminate violence. However, a density of danger as it is necessary for the assumption of a serious and individual risk cannot be established. Nor do the applicants possess individual characteristics which result in an increased risk for them when compared to other members of the civilian population.
Subsidiary protection was granted on grounds that the applicant, from Iran, could be at risk inhuman or degrading treatment. The applicant based his asylum claim on the political activities of his brother in his country of asylum, as well as his own participation in protests in Iran. The Court found that after having spent two years in Finland as an asylum seeker it was likely that the applicant would be of special interest to the Iranian authorities.
The applicant is not entitled to protection from deportation within the meaning of Section 60 (7) (2) of the Residence Act / Art 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive as the levels of indiscriminate violence in his home area are not characterised by a sufficient "density of danger".
The Applicant, S.H., is a Bhutanese national of ethnic Nepalese origin who currently lives in Huddersfield. He claimed asylum in the UK, but the application was refused and he was served with removal directions. Prior to his removal, the Court indicated to the United Kingdom Government that he should not be expelled. Relying on Article 3 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment), the Applicant complained that his removal to Bhutan would expose him to a risk of ill-treatment on account of his ethnicity, his status as a failed asylum seeker, and as the close relative of a human rights activist who has been granted asylum in the United Kingdom.
Where the situation described in Art 15(c) of the Qualification Directive does not occur in all parts of the country of origin, it must be assessed in respect of the distinct area of the country from which the applicant originates.
The facilitated standard of proof under Art. 4.4 of the Qualification Directive may be applied to the examination of subsidiary protection. Under German law, subsidiary protection is not excluded on the ground that the applicant is a “danger to the community”.
The current situation in the province of Kabul cannot be seen as a situation of indiscriminate generalised violence, within the meaning of Article L.712-1 c) of Ceseda [which transposes Article 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive].
The High Administrative Court wrongly found that returnees without a family network generally could not return to Kabul as an internal protection alternative. The High Administrative Court was obliged to examine whether the applicant was the owner of property which might enable him to safeguard his means of existence upon return.
The case involves consideration by the Supreme Court of Ireland of whether or not the Minister for Justice has a discretion to consider an application for subsidiary protection from a person who has a deportation order made prior to the 20.10.2006, the date on which the law transposing the Qualification Directive came in to effect in Ireland. The Court overturned a decision of the High Court and stated that the Minister for Justice does not have discretion to consider an application for subsidiary protection from a person with a deportation order prior to the 20.10.2006.
The applicant claimed asylum in 2006 (along with her children) alleging a well founded fear of persecution on the grounds of political opinion. The application was refused in the initial procedure and on appeal. She returned to Colombia and two years later, returned to Spain and reapplied for asylum and was again refused. She lodged an appeal before the Supreme Court and was granted subsidiary protection.