Case summaries
The Court suspended domestic proceedings and referred the case for preliminary ruling procedure to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The Court asked the CJEU to clarify the substance of its ban on exposing applicants for international protection to ‘tests’ to substantiate their sexual orientation.
This case dealt with the issue of whether the Secretary of State’s certification of the asylum claims of the two independent applicants as “clearly unfounded” was flawed on public law grounds, and the important difference between a decision on refugee status itself and a decision on a claim being “clearly unfounded”.
The applicant challenged the Belgian Minister of Asylum and Migration’s decision not to grant him a humanitarian visa via an emergency application before the CALL. He relied on the following grounds: inter alia, (i) his medical condition and (ii) the poor living conditions of the West Bank in Palestine.
The CALL decided (i) these two elements justified an urgent decision, (ii) there was a risk of serious prejudice which would be difficult to remedy if the Minister’s decision was enforced, and (iii) there were serious grounds for invalidating the Minister’s decision since denying a visa to the applicant was likely to constitute a breach of art. 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment), thus fulfilling the three conditions under art. 39/82 of the Belgian Aliens Law 15-12-1980.
The judgment examined whether returns of asylum seekers to Bulgaria would be contrary to their Article 3 rights. The court held that the Bulgarian system has significantly improved since the UNHCR report in 2014 which prohibited returns of asylum seekers. As a result the returns would not be in breach of Article 3.
The Italian consolidated Law on Migration (Art. 5(6) n. 286/1998) requires humanitarian protection to be given where a person is in a situation of vulnerability. Such a situation occurs when the applicant’s constitutional and international fundamental rights, such as health and nutrition, are compromised.
The decision of denying asylum is disproportionate, as the fact that the acts of persecution are indiscriminate and affect a large majority of the population do not exclude the application of the 1951 Convention when the necessary elements of the provision are present. The reports of UNHCR were also noted in the Court’s assessment, particularly regarding the risk groups that the organisation has characterised.
Article 33 of the Qualification Directive, read in conjunction with the Geneva Convention, requires Member States to allow persons to whom they have granted subsidiary protection status not only to move freely within their territory but also to choose their place of residence within that territory. However, the Directive does not prevent beneficiaries of subsidiary protection status from being subject to a residence condition for the purpose of promoting their integration where said group of persons are not in a comparable situation as non-EU citizens.
A refusal to permit re-unification of family members with a child granted asylum in the United Kingdom can constitute a disproportionate breach of the right to respect for family life enjoyed by all family members under Article 8 ECHR despite the Immigration Rules not providing for family reunification where a child has been granted asylum in the UK.
It is an appeal against the decision handed down by the Administrative Court of Lisboa that granted asylum to a Syrian citizen.
The recursive claim was declared unfounded by the Central Court, inter alia because the applicant’s mere transit from Brazil could not be considered as a connecting link that could render Brazil a safe third country.
The Upper Tribunal ordered the Secretary of State for the Home Department to immediately admit four vulnerable Syrians from an unofficial migrant camp in France to the United Kingdom in order to be reunited with refugee family members during the examination their asylum applications. Although they had not applied for asylum in France or been subject to Dublin procedures, the particular circumstances meant that failing to do so would lead to a disproportionate interference with their right to respect for family life.