Case summaries
In countries where there is a high prevalence of female genital mutilation (FGM), persons who have demonstrated that they oppose this practice have thus infringed the customary norms of their country of origin and therefore can be considered as having a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of membership of a particular social group in the meaning of Article 1A(2)of 1951 Refugee Convention.
A serious and individual threat to life and limb may result from a general risk in the context of an armed conflict if the risk is enhanced because of the applicant’s individual circumstances or from an extraordinary situation which is characterised by such a high degree of risk that practically any civilian would be exposed to a serious and individual threat simply by his or her presence in the affected region.
Homosexuals in Tunisia, even those that do not proclaim or overtly demonstrate their sexual orientation, can be considered as constituting a specific and sufficiently identifiable whole so as to form a group whose members would face a risk of persecution for reasons of common characteristics which define them in the eyes of the Tunisian authorities and society.
A woman having undergone female genital mutilation FGM, who benefitted from reconstructive surgery in France, an act considered as an infringement of Guinean customs despite its official ban, must be considered as a member of the social group formed by women who oppose female genital mutilation practiced in Guinea.
The requirement of an individualisation of the threat to the life or person of an applicant for subsidiary protection is inversely proportional to the degree of indiscriminate violence which characterises the armed conflict.
The case concerned an appeal against a refusal to grant refugee status on the grounds that the applicant lacked credibility as the country of origin information (COI) submitted by the applicant was not verified by the national documentation service providing COI.
The discrepancies between the evidence which the Administration and the asylum Applicant presented to the Council of State created serious doubts about whether the facts invoked by the Applicant to confirm his refugee status were correctly recorded and in general about the lawful examination of the said application in compliance with the procedures stipulated by the provisions of Articles 2(3) and 3(7) of Presidential Decree 61/1999.
In this case the Court of Appeal considered the interpretation of Art 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive applying the decision of the CJEU in Elgafaji (C-465/07; 17 February, 2009).
The situation which prevails today in Mogadishu must be seen as a situation of generalised violence resulting from a situation of internal armed conflict. Its intensity is sufficient to consider that today the applicant faces a serious, direct and individual threat to his life or person, without being able to prevail himself of any protection.