Case summaries
This case concerned the conditions under which a refusal to perform military service for conscientious reasons may justify granting refugee status. The Minister for Public Order did not give reasons for deviating from the competent Committee's recommendation, nor did he find it to be ambiguous or to have any other legal defect, while he could have referred the case back to that body for reassessment. The application for annulment is granted.
Instead of rejecting the application, the Court granted subsidiary protection status to the single female Applicant and her minor children, as their return to the country of origin would lead to the risk of serious harm (indiscriminate violence).
B.G., a citizen of the Russian Federation, applied for refugee status, citing persecution experienced due to his brother being in prison. The authorities of both instances questioned his credibility, citing numerous inconsistencies in the various testimonies given. The foreignor then appealed to the Regional Administrative Court, which dismissed the appeal on the grounds that the proceedings had been conducted properly and referring to the fact that the foreignor was able to flee internally in his country of origin.
The authority conducting the proceedings provides, where necessary, translations into Polish of documents in a foreign language that are admissible as evidence in refugee status proceedings.
The option of internal flight means that if there is a part of the country of origin where there are no circumstances justifying the foreignor's fear of persecution or serious harm and it can reasonably be presumed that the foreignor will be able to move there without impediment, there is no well-founded fear of persecution or actual risk of serious harm in the country of origin. If the conditions in one region do not suit the foreignor, he can try to move to another part of the country.
The age of the child and the mental state of the Applicant as well as the ban on more detailed questioning on the reasons for fleeing in the initial police interview should have been taken into account to a greater extent when assessing the assertion of flight. The lack of discussion of these aspects represents a failure to investigate several decisive points, which made the decision by the Asylum Court arbitrary and therefore unconstitutional
The shifting of the burden of proof according to Article 4 (4) of the Qualification Directive applies if the Applicant refers to previous acts of persecution or threats as an indicator of the well-foundedness of his fear that persecution would resume if he were to return to his home country.
If it is assumed that the individual concerned was under immediate threat of persecution associated with his ethnicity when he left his home country, then the link is not simply with the ethnicity of the individual concerned (Chechen in this case), but also with the enmity generally expressed by the persecuting security forces against this ethnic group and their presumed political convictions.
The Applicant was a homosexual male from Iran who had renounced Islam and was studying the catechism of the Roman Catholic doctrine. It was held that the Applicant had no well-founded (objective) fear of persecution on the grounds of changing his religious beliefs.
Regarding the risks associated with his sexual orientation, the fear that the Applicant expressed was deemed to be well-founded, and it was held that not externalising his sexual orientation to avoid danger would, in and of itself, constitute serious harm to his right to respect for his private life and his right to not be discriminated against. Therefore, his refugee status was recognised and he was granted the international protection in the form of refugee status.
This case involved recognition of refugee status under Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention on grounds of religious beliefs.
More specifically, it was held that the arrest and torture the Applicant suffered at the hands of his father and the State authorities because of his Christian faith, the risk of being executed for apostasy because he was baptised in Greece, and the risk of being arrested and maltreated again should he return to Iran, constituted persecution under Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention, the actor of persecution being the State. Furthermore, being forced to conceal one's religious beliefs and/or proclaim belief in another religionin order to avoid persecution and/or deprivation of basic rights constitutes a breach of religious freedom under Article 9 of the ECHR and also the related case law of the ECtHR.
The third action in a row brought by a foreign woman for refugee status ended in the issue of a judgment dismissing the case as it was found that the basis for the application was the same as in the previous cases and the application was therefore inadmissible. The Court overturned the negative decision by the Polish Council for Refugees, as the new application by the foreign woman stated that she had divorced her then husband and had been in a relationship for a year with a Polish citizen, which might cause persecution on religious grounds were she to return to her country of origin.
The applicant stated that he had been a member of the Taliban amongst other things. The Federal Asylum Agency (BAA) declared that the expulsion of the applicant to Afghanistan was permissible. The Asylum Court acted on the assumption of the existence of the ground for exclusion from asylum of ”Crimes against humanity“ and therefore granted neither asylum nor subsidiary protection, but revoked the expulsion to Afghanistan. The Constitutional Court allowed the appeal by the applicant against this decision as sufficient findings were not established in relation to the assumed crime against humanity.
Domestic protection is deemed to exist even if it is not determined in advance how effective it is.