Case summaries

The revocation of refugee status in the case of a Kurd from Iraq was upheld: Even if one presumes that an internal armed conflict is taking place in the applicant’s home province (Tamim), it cannot be assumed that the indiscriminate violence has reached such a high level that practically any civilian is at risk of a serious and individual threat simply by his or her presence in the region.

This case concerned the appropriate manner in which an application for subsidiary protection is to be decided where there may be at least an implicit claim of a “serious and individual threat” to the applicant by reason of indiscriminate violence. The Court found that Article 15(c) of the Directive does not impose a free-standing obligation on the Minister to investigate a possible armed conflict situation, it is for the applicant to make this claim and to make submissions and offer evidence establishing that he is from a place where there is a situation of international of internal armed conflict, and that he is at risk of serious harm by reason of indiscriminate violence.

Vendetta constitutes a serious harm falling within the scope of subsidiary protection.

Article 29(1), introductory paragraph and (b) of the Foreigners Act (2000) (which provides protection in the Netherlands against a potential breach of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights) provides for the same protection as Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive. The latter article therefore does not amend the law.

Article 29(1), introductory paragraph and (b) of the Foreigners Act (2000) (which provides protection in the Netherlands against a potential breach of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights) provides for the same protection as Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive. The latter article therefore does not amend the law.

This case concerned the interpretation of Article 4(4) of the Qualification Directive and the transposing Irish measure, which had added certain wording. The Court noted that the Directive left it open to Member States to introduce more favourable standards so long as they are compatible with the Directive. The Court held that the additional wording merely allowed a decision-maker in a case of compelling reasons, to determine eligibility for subsidiary protection as established without being obliged to be fully satisfied that previous serious harm inflicted upon an applicant runs a risk of being repeated.

“Good reasons,” as defined in Art 4.4 of the Qualification Directive exist if a recurrence of past persecution is not expected and there is no enhanced risk of first-time persecution of a similar kind. At present, there are “good reasons” to consider persecution of Chechens who return to Chechnya, unless they belong to a particular risk group, will not be repeated.

In this case the Tribunal sought to apply the guidance in Elgafaji on Art 15(c) and give country guidance on Afghanistan.

Subsidiary protection pursuant to Art. 14a(2)(b) of the Act on Asylum (serious harm consisting of inhuman or degrading treatment) may also be granted in so-called humanitarian cases. This goes beyond the scope of Article 15(b) of the Qualification Directive; however, it is compatible with the directive. In order to grant subsidiary protection in so-called humanitarian cases, the factual circumstances need to reach the standard set out in the judgment of the ECtHR, D. v. the United Kingdom.

The Office of Immigration and Nationality (OIN) found the applicant not credible and therefore did not assess the risk of serious harm. Instead the OIN granted protection against refoulement. The Metropolitan Court ruled that the OIN was obliged to assess conditions for subsidiary protection and serious harm even if the applicant was not found credible.