Case summaries

When medico-legal evidence of torture is provided by specialists and found credible it is incumbent on the Migration Board to put forward evidence that there is no further risk of torture in the relevant country. 

If necessary medicines are not accessible through legal means in the country of origin adequate care is not available. 

This case concerned the consideration of expert medical evidence by asylum decision makers and the link with the assessment of credibility. The Court found that the Refugee Appeals Tribunal failed adequately to consider strong medical evidence relating to torture in assessing the overall credibility of the applicant’s refugee claim. The Court also found that it is incumbent upon the asylum decision maker to give reasons for rejecting the contents of medico-legal reports, especially those with a high probative value.

The applicant claimed asylum in 2006 (along with her children) alleging a well founded fear of persecution on the grounds of political opinion. The application was refused in the initial procedure and on appeal.  She returned to Colombia and two years later, returned to Spain and reapplied for asylum and was again refused. She lodged an appeal before the Supreme Court and was granted subsidiary protection.

The European Court of Human Rights held that the deportation of an Iranian national to Iran would give rise to a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.

This case concerned risk upon return to Iran in a situation where a person has previously been detained and tortured there and had supporting medical evidence. The Court found a violation of Art. 3 ECHR if the Applicant were to be deported to Iran.

The Court obliged the Respondent to conduct new proceedings as it expressed an opinion on the Claimant’s state of health without appointing an expert.

The decision of the asylum authority was annulled on the basis that there was insufficient evidence that an internal protection alternative existed. 

The petition for an ab initio examination of the asylum application was rejected by the General Secretary of the Ministry of Public Order (decision being appealed in this case) because the evidence submitted was not deemed to be new and crucial. That ruling in the contested decision was flawed because the General Secretary did not have the authority to decide whether the Applicant had refugee status deeming the evidence submitted (a medical report which linked clinical findings to torture) to not be crucial for granting asylum. Instead, he should have ordered an ab initio examination of the asylum application, making the Administration comply with the relevant procedure. If, during that procedure, it was found that there was a legitimate case, then the Administration should have recognised the Applicant as a refugee.

The fact that a child suffered from epilepsy and that the quality of the care that the child could obtain in Sweden was higher than in the country of origin were not sufficient grounds to grant a residence permit on the grounds of “particularly distressing circumstances” which may only be granted in exceptional cases.